Regarding fundamental protocols in cryptography, the Diffie-Hellman (Diffie and Hellman, 1976) public key exchange protocol is one of the oldest and most widely used in today's applications. Consequently, many specific cryptographic implementations depend on its security. Typically, an underlying (finite dimensional) group is selected to provide candidates for the key. The study of the security of the exchange as depending on the structure of the underlying group is even today poorly understood, with the most common approaches relying on the security of the Discrete Logarithm problem or on the size of the group. Recent developments bring to attention that the relationship is not necessarily valid and that more research is needed that will relate the underlying structure of the group and the security of the Diffie-Hellman exchange. In this chapter we describe the problem in detail, we present the relationship with the previously studied Discrete Logarithm and Computational Diffie-Hellman problems, we expose the various concepts of security, and we introduce a new statistical concept specifically designed to serve the assessment of the security of the exchange.
Introduction
A key exchange protocol, is any algorithm through which two parties A and B agree on a common key AB K .Once the key is established, any further information shared between the parties is encoded, transmitted and decoded using the key . The protocol is secure if any third party C finds it extremely hard (almost impossible) to identify the key.
AB K
In a public key exchange protocol the two parties agree on a common key pooled from a set S while communicating over an insecure channel. The difference is that all the information exchanged over the insecure channel as well as the set of possible keys S is known by the perpetrator C. If C cannot tell apart from any other value in the set S guarantees that it is computationally unfeasible to gain "any" partial information on the key.
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol Diffie and Hellman (1976) is a primary example of a public key exchange protocol. In its most basic form, the protocol chooses a finite cyclic group ( ) ⋅ , G of order N, with generator g, where denotes the group operation. In what follows we chose the multiplicative operation to denote the operation in the group, and thus the group G is generated by the powers of g (i.e., values chosen (a and b) they can both compute , which or a publicly known derivation of that becomes the public key. In the cryptology literature there are two concepts of security -the core security and the concept of semantic security which leads to various security models. The semantic security and the related concepts come under the name of "provable security" Koblitz and Menezes (2004) . The core security of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol depends on the discrete logarithm problem, the computational Diffie-Hellman problem and the decision Diffie-Hellman problem. In this article we are concerned with the core security of the exchange. We give a brief introduction to the discrete logarithm problem and the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, for more on these a reader can look at Koblitz and Menezes (2004) or Stinson (2005) .
In the present work we will be concerned with the practical security of this protocol. We will investigate the various concepts of security and the known relationships between them. We interpret security in a probabilistic manner and devise a statistical test that will "assess" the security of the exchange in a given group. Our main objective is to find a test that would determine given two cyclic groups and with similar orders but perhaps different structures whether or not the security of the key exchange is the same using either group.
Traditionally the study of the security of the exchange was restricted to the verification of the following assumptions:
The Discrete Logarithm Assumption (DL): For a cyclic group G, generated by g, we are given g and , n∈N, the challenge is to compute n. Whether or not these assumptions are true in a given group are called the respective problems. For example we say that the Discrete Logarithm problem is hard in a given group if the DL assumption is satisfied in that group.
Clearly, if these assumptions are not satisfied then C, an adversary 1 , can gain access to the key . The relationship between these two assumptions has been extensively studied. It is clear that the CDH assumption will not be satisfied in a group where finding the solution to the discrete logarithm problem is easy. In Maurer and Wolf (1999) , Boneh and Lipton (1996) , the authors show that in several settings the validity of the CDH assumption and the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm problem are in fact equivalent.
ab g
Unfortunately, the DL and the CDH assumptions are not enough to ensure security of the DiffieHellman key exchange protocol. Even if these assumptions are true, the eavesdropper C may still be able to gain useful information about . For example, if C can predict 90% of the bits in with high probability then for all intents and purposes the key exchange protocol is broken. Moreover, there exist protocols where the knowledge of even one bit will break its security (Casino electronic games). With the current state of knowledge we cannot be confident that assuming only CDH, a scenario like the one described above does not exist (Boneh (1998) In this form the DDH assumption constitutes a sufficient condition for the security of the DiffieHellman key exchange protocol since it directly assesses the established key.
Furthermore, Joux and Nguyen (2003) construct groups based on elliptic curves where the DDH assumption is not satisfied while the CDH and the DL problems are proven to be equivalent and hard. This fact shows that the notions are not equivalent and prompts the necessity to directly check the validity of the DDH assumption for a given group.
The DDH assumption is assumed, either implicitly or explicitly in many cryptographic systems and protocols. Applications include: the many implementations of the DH key exchange itself (e.g., Diffie et al. (1992) ), the El-Gamal encryption scheme El-Gamal (1984) , the undeniable signatures algorithm Chaum and van Antwerpen (1989) , Feldsman's verifiable secret sharing protocol Feldman (1987) , Pedersen (1991) , and most recently an implementation to the SSH file transfer protocol (Friedl et al., 2006) . For a much more detailed list we point to Naor and Reingold (1997) .
The DDH assumption in the form presented above is a little vague because of the use of the predicate, "hard to decide". Surprisingly, attempts to make the DDH assumption explicit were not made until late after its formulation in Diffie and Hellman (1976) . The first ventures Boneh and Lipton (1996) use standard cryptographic machinery (Yao (1982) ; Goldwasser and Micali (1984) ), to express the assumption in terms of computational indistinguishability. Put in this traditional cryptographic form it was discovered quickly by Stadler (1996) and independently Naor and Reingold (1997) that if one assumes the existence of a polynomial time probabilistic algorithm which distinguishes the real key from the other possible values even with a very small probability ab g 2 (for all the possible inputs), then another polynomial time algorithm can be constructed from the first which will output with a very large (almost one) probability. The only requirement is that the size of the group is known, requirement lessened by Boneh (1998) which only requires finiteness of the group. ab g All this work points toward a more specific definition based entirely on the notion of statistical significance. Indeed, this fact materialized in a series of papers Canetti et al. (1999); Canetti et al. (2000) ; Friedlander and Shparlinski (2001) ; Vasco et al. (2004) , which call this new form of the assumption the Diffie Hellman Indistinguishability assumption (DHI). We note that Gennaro et al. (2004) ; Joux and Nguyen (2003) use the same form except it continues to call it DDH. We point the reader to Håstad et al. (1999) for a detailed discussion on the concept of statistical significance versus computational significance; in the context of pseudo-random number generation.
In order to introduce this assumption we give the definition of a discrete uniformly distributed random variable.
2 but not negligible. For the sake of completeness we give here the whole definition. It is presented in the footnote since it is not relevant to our approach at all. Suppose that the group G where the exchange takes place has order N and . It is said that a probabilistic algorithm A decides on the right key with small (non-negligible) probability if there exist a polynomial expression p(⋅) such that for any r∈G: 
are the sets which contain the discontinuity points of , respectively .
F
In our specific case the state space is finite, therefore the distribution functions and are just step functions with jumps in a compact set included in the real axis R, thus using the right continuity of the distribution functions, the usual definition translates here in equality everywhere. We conclude that in our context, statistical indistinguishability means that the variables have the same distribution. Joux and Nguyen (2003) require that the distribution of the entire triple ( )
be Discrete Uniform on the elements of
G DU
). Given an outcome (x,y,z) we may write using the simple multiplicative rule:
Under the original condition that a and b are DU({1,…,N}) and using the fact that g is a generator for G, the distribution of
, thus the two formulations are perfectly equivalent.
In general it is known that statistical indistinguishability implies computational indistinguishability, but the reverse is not in general true, Goldreich (2001) . The following lemma states the same result in our specific case using the assumptions presented in this section: DHI and DDH.
Lemma 1 In a group G of order N, if the DHI assumption is true then the DDH assumption is true as well.
Proof. Assume that DHI is true in G. Then for given , , the probability
for any z∈G. This is the hardest possible scenario in the DDH assumption and hence the DDH assumption is satisfied.
This lemma says that in any group G, DHI is a stronger 3 condition than that of the DDH assumption. If we look at the statements in the two assumptions we find that DHI provides a measure of hardness over the DDH assumption via the uniform distribution. 3 or at least as strong This approach is identical with the approach of Canetti et al (1999) . Canetti et al (2000), Why did we choose our approach and not the more traditional (and established) trivariate (joint) distribution approach? The reason is that our approach is more convenient for checking. It essentially amounts to checking whether a one dimensional distribution is close to the ever, if this su no region in cure. In d
DU(G)
while the more now introduce some the respectively. traditional approach would require verifying three-dimensional distributions.
For the one-dimensional distribution we have a well defined way to establish measure of information present in data: the entropy measure. We note that the same measure exists for 3-dim distributions but it is more cumbersome to use in practical problems. We shall notations and definitions.
Let X, Y, and Z be three discrete random variables taking values in sets 
In the above definition we choose to work with the natural logarithm, however any other basis will be quivalent for our purpose due to t co tant in the usual definition of the entropy function (see Shannon (1948) ). (2) and (3) The idea is to use the entropy function (3) in the sense of Kullback-Leibler divergence (Kullback and Leibler, 1951) as a measure of departure from the entropy calculated under the hypothesis of Uniform distribution. Specifically, using earlier notation, we wish to construct a statistical test that will check the validity of the following hypotheses: 
Remark 3 In the definition of the entropy functions
A is the set of all possible N 2 triples ) , and we have used ) ( 1 x to indicator function of the set A⊂ Ω, i.e., } 1 , ) , , (
where once again denotes the multiplicity of , but in the given sample of n observations. We took servations in the samp by multiplying with the If we would be able to c culate the distribution of T n knowing that is distributed as a ultivariate hypergeometric random vector then we in position to test of uniformity (4) by calculating the p-value of the test statistic (8) using this distribution.
inding the distribution of the test statistic under H in (9) is however not an easy task. This is the rea dge of this
Multivariate hy
T n under the er the hypothesis H 0 using (9), and then we construct mpirical distribution found atisfied in the given group G. Exte (9). These values are obtained from the assumption that H 0 is true; this allow us to calculate the empirical distribution of our sample statistic null hypothesis. The pvalue of our test is given by the proportion of values as extreme or more than the one calculated in (8) using the group G. A small p-value is evidence against the null hypothesis in (4) that the sample comes from a uniform distribution. We summarize the procedure bellow:
Testing procedure to determine validity of DHI for a group G i. We take a sample of size n and we calculate the test statistic as in (8). ii. We generate many test statistic values und their empirical distribution. iii. We calculate the p-value of the test as the proportion of values in the e in (ii) lower than the test value found using G in (i). iv. If the p-value is small we reject the DHI assumption. If the p-value is big we did not find evidence that the DHI is not s nsion to two or more groups note that the absolute value of the test N T and its estimate n T represent a measure of departure tion. The bigger the estimate the further from the Discrete Uniform distribu niform distribution and the weaker is is the distance from the the validity of the DHI assumption. Remark 3 also tells us that the ature of the group operation is irrelevant for the testing procedure. Therefore, we can use the test as a to u n tool to compare the strength of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange pro col in two or more groups. In order to do so the order of the groups in the comparison needs to be similar and, more importantly, the sample size on the basis of which we calculate the permutation test needs to be the same. We take advantage of the ability to compare different groups in the next section.
esting the Diffie-Hellmann indistinguishability assumption in the multiplicative group
e note that the simplest groups cannot be tested with the current procedure since the discrete rocedure for the finite gro with the multiplicative operation. We present the following isher against DDH (Gennaro et al. 004) Z is not secure. It is also conjectured that some groups are more secure than others. Looking at the problem from that perspective, for which groups are mo ily broken using th that by increasing the size of the group one can make the group mo
We can see from the image presented that the second assertion is not true. Just increasing the size of the group does not make it more secure. Remembering that a smaller relative distance corresponds to closeness to the Discrete uniform distribution on the elements of G, we see from the Z . This tes that the choice of the group G rather than its size is essential for the security of the DiffieHellman key exchange protocol. 
Comparison of the DHI assumption across groups
ext we wanted to give an indication of groups that are more secure than others. It is known that
We tested this theory for a large set of groups with varying p's. We looked at all primes between imilar with the primes e primes in the range 9000 to 11000, the subgroups are of order 4500 to 5500. Z are the ones obtained when p is a safe prime i.e., of the form p=2q+1 where q is another prime Menezes et al. (1996) . We shall call any such group a safe group. * p Z 2000 and 4000, and again for primes between 9000 and 11000. The reason for the two separate segments of primes is that we expect some sort of consistency between them. We show the distribution of the test values for these groups separated into safe and not safe primes in Figures 2 and 3 .
First, we notice that the behavior of primes in the range 2000 to 4000 is very s for the higher range 9000 to 11000. Second, in both ranges we see the same conclusion applies, the safe prime groups are more secure than any other groups. However, the test estimate obtained for each of the safe prime groups is significantly different from zero therefore there is no safe group in the ranges given for which the DHI assumption is verified. This seems to confirm the assertion in the Example 5.1.
Next, we look to Example 5.2. We will use our test for the prime subgroups of each of the saf in the range 9000 to 11000. More specifically, we look at each is remarkable the closeness of these values to each other considering that the der of the group varies between 9000 and 11000 a 20% var for even larger p's we will see the same sort of consistency in the values. This will imply that groups with the same operational structure will have similar behavior from the point of view of the Diffie-Hellman security. However, there is a variation in the values as illustrated in the Figure 6 (Fig. 4) . We compare the prime subgroups with the corresponding safe groups. Values closer to zero represent safer groups for DH exchange. Furthermore, in Figure 7 we plot the test values versus the size of the group from which the prime subgroup originated. We can immediately see that as the size of the group increases the exchange tends to become more secure as measured by our test. This increases our belief in the test results and brings evidence that as the size of the group increases and the structure of the underlying group remains the same the security of the exchange increases as well. Figure 6 . We note that the test values for this part were estimated using the same sample size (8 million) to insure that the test values are comparable and that variability of the test values is the same regardless of the size of the group.
A look at the relationship with the Discrete Logarithm problem
In this section we study in more depth the distribution of the test values as p varies in the ranges considered. We calculate the test values for each such group (for such small groups we do not need to estimate or construct statistical distributions for the test values), with the idea to compare the groups themselves from the perspective of the test and identify (if possible) patterns. To our knowledge this is the first approach of this kind.
We first look to ( ) ⋅ , * p Z , for p primes in the two ranges p∈ (2000, 4000) and p∈ (9000, 11000) . We plot the test values in the Figure 8 .
It is known -due to the existence of the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm 4 that in all of these groups the Discrete Logarithm problem is easy and therefore the Diffie Hellman exchange should be breakable. It is also conjectured that the actual security depends on the size of the largest factor in the decomposition of p−1 5 . For this reason it is believed that the "most secure" groups among ( ) ⋅ , In our case we consider the security of the Diffie Hellman exchange. Since the Discrete Logarithm assumption is a necessary condition for this security we expect that our test will identify these assertions and by using our test we will be able to answer questions related to the DL problem. Figure 8 presents the test values vs. the size of the largest prime factor in the decomposition of . We can immediately see that the structure of the test values for the two ranges is very similar. In both of these images, points corresponding to values closer to 0 on the y axis represent groups that are more secure for the DH exchange. Note that while the points in the lower right corner of the image correspond indeed to the safe primes and they are clearly more secure than the other groups as the popular belief would tell us, we can also see that there exist certain groups which have a small factor (lower left corner) and yet they are comparably secure. This is investigated further in the Figure 9 where we plot the test values obtained for each group versus the number of factors in the decomposition of p−1. While we can see more clearly now that the groups corresponding to the safe primes (x=2 factors in the plot) are indeed more secure than all the other groups, we also find that generally as the number of factors in the decomposition increases the security decreases.
Once again we remark the closeness of the two plots in Figure 9 . Based on the two pair of plots it would seem that both the number of factors and the size of the largest factor are important elements when considering the security of the exchange.
But now we are dealing with a statistical problem: trying to relate two determining factors to the variable that quantifies the security of the exchange. There probably exist other factors that are important but let us concentrate on these two for the current work. We know from the statistical theory that if there would be no interaction between the number of factors in the decomposition and the size of the largest factor then we should see points inside each category close to parallel lines. For exemplification we plotted in Figure 10 the same image as in Figure 9 (b), but with the points separated by the number of factors in each group. We eliminated the safe groups from the comparison and we only made the picture for p∈ (9000, 11000) since for the other range the image looks very similar. We can start to see that there must be interaction between the two factors. To exemplify better we separated the points depending on the number of factors and we plotted them in Figure 11 . We see better that the determining elements for the security of the DH exchange seem to be correlated (they are interacting). Next we analyze statistically the relationship between the test values that quantify the strength of the relationship and the size of the largest factor in the decomposition of p−1 (treated as a quantitative variable) and the number of factors in the same decomposition (treated as a categorical variable). We included interaction terms in the model and we present the ANOVA table in Table 1.  Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients of the regression lines for each level, and for each, a test of whether the mean is actually zero. There are 218 primes between 9,000 and 11,000. We note that there was only one prime within the range whose p−1 decomposition had 10 factors thus the interaction for that level could not be estimated. 6.041e-03 1.297e-02 0.466 0.641823 Signif. codes: '***' = 0.001; '**'= 0.01; '*' = 0.05; '.' = 0.1
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We can see very clearly from the table that the interaction between the two factors analyzed is significant. We do not present the results for the other range of primes studied 2000−4000 since they are entirely similar.
So what is the conclusion to be drawn from these numbers?
These numbers show that the interaction between the number of factors in the decomposition of p−1 and the size of the largest factor in the decomposition is statistically significant for the security of the Diffie-Hellman security as quantified by our test.
In plain terms, it would seem natural that as the size of the largest factor in the decomposition increases the group becomes more complex and therefore it is more secure. Likewise, as the number of factors in the decomposition increases, there are more equations to solve modulo each factor therefore having a larger number intuitively would also increase the security.
However, as the results in the table show that is not necessarily so, and since the interaction between the two is significant the combination of the two factors is important and the seemingly logical statements presented are not necessarily true.
Future Trends
The papers studying statistical aspects of the distribution of the key of the Diffie-Hellmann exchange are generally concerned with the limiting distribution as the size of the underlying group converges to infinity. However, in practice we do not work with infinite groups and the question of how fast the key distribution converges to infinity is valid and of significant interest. We hope with convinced the reader that the rate of convergence is not uniform across types of the groups and that some group structures lead to a much faster convergence than others.
However it would be much more interesting if we could follow the analysis and observe similar conclusions for very large primes, typically used in cryptography (of the order comparable with ). The use of our testing procedure, ad-literam as in the current work prevents us from analyzing such large groups directly.
2
In the future we plan to investigate directions of circumventing the permutation testing approach, thus eliminating the need for the sample generation process and transforming the methodology into a practical procedure applicable to big size groups. For this purpose several directions are possible. One direction is to approximate the distribution of the test in (9) with a multinomial distribution, then use a multivariate normal distribution as a second approximation. This would give us an approximate distribution of the test statistic under the null hypothesis, which should allow us to calculate the p-value of the test directly without the need of the permutation testing.
Another direction is to put together outcomes into coarser groups and look at the distribution of these groups of outcomes. This idea is similar with the approach of Canetti et al. (1999) and Banks et al. (2006) , and will allow us to speed up the procedure in order to apply it to much larger groups.
A third direction is to look at the distribution of the binary representation of prime subgroups of a large group and compare the new resulting groups.
If the computing power suffices or if any of these directions would prove valid the resulting test procedure will allow a comparison between the prime subgroup of a large ( ) ⋅ , * p Z which we asserted to be secure and a similarly sized finite group defined using elliptical curves. This would answer a question of undeniable importance: are the groups constructed using elliptical curves potentially more secure than simpler structure groups?
Conclusion
This paper does not break or gives an algorithm to break the Diffie-Hellman exchange. What we do is analyze empirically how hard would it be to break the exchange, on average, on any random inputs drawn from the underlying group. The groups under study were small in order (very far from the typical cryptographic groups used in practice), but we give compelling evidence that the security of the exchange tends to be dependent on the structure of the underlying groups. That structure can be recovered and rediscovered over and over as the group size increases.
We have studied the relationship between the security of the Diffie Hellman public key exchange protocol and the structure of the underlying group. We looked at groups were the protocol is provable not secure (of the type ( ) ⋅ , * p Z ). We have found compelling evidence that breaking it (in the sense of actually finding the key) is dependent not only on the size of the largest factor in the decomposition of p-1 but also on the number of terms in the decomposition. Furthermore, the relationship is not straightforward (as either one increases the security increases) since the interaction between these two determining factors is statistically significant. This means that it is entirely possible to have a group with large prime factor in the decomposition and a large number of terms in the decomposition of p-1 and yet to be easier to break (on average for random inputs) than another groups where both these factors are smaller but they interact in a different way.
We show using statistical arguments that the prime subgroups of the groups of type ( ) ⋅ , * p Z are the most secure groups we have studied. Furthermore, if one assumes that the structure of the group from which the subgroups are drawn remains the same, increasing the group's size indeed translates into increasing the security of the Diffie-Hellman exchange as well.
